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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 15-2604 
________________ 
 
JEFFREY VILINSKY, 
    Appellant                                 
 
v. 
 
PHELAN HALLINAN & DIAMOND, PC, 
    
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 1-15-cv-00650) 
 
District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
Tuesday, March 1, 2016 
 
Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
 
 
(Opinion filed: March 2, 2016) 
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______________________ 
 
OPINION 
______________________ 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.  
 Appellant Jeffrey Vilinsky brings a claim under § 805(a)(2) of the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) (1977).  Section 805(a)(2) 
prohibits debt collectors from “communicat[ing] with a consumer in connection with the 
collection of any debt . . . if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an 
attorney.”  Id.  The District Court dismissed the claim pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6).  
We will affirm.  
I 
 Appellant Jeffrey Vilinsky owned real property in Fair Lawn, New Jersey.  In 
2007, he signed a loan agreement with Quicken Loans and executed a promissory note 
secured by a mortgage on the New Jersey property.  After closing, Quicken sold the loan 
to CitiMortgage, who later sold its interest to PennyMac.   
 Due to unforeseen economic circumstances, Vilinsky defaulted on the loan.  As a 
result, PennyMac, the mortgage holder at the time, hired appellee Phelan Hallinan & 
Diamond as counsel and filed a foreclosure action against Vilinsky.  Vilinsky retained 
Denbeaux & Denbeaux as counsel.  On March 10, 2014, the matter was tried before the 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, and a verdict was returned for 
PennyMac.  The case was referred “back to the Office of Foreclosure to proceed on an 
uncontested basis.”  App. 40a.   
 Seven months later, PennyMac sold the loan to PMT NPL Financing.  Phelan sent 
Vilinsky a letter notifying him of the assignment.  The notice identified the amount of the 
loan,1 the mortgaged property address and the mortgagors by name: Jeffrey and Pnina 
Vilinsky.  It also provided a notice, which stated: 
 TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same unto the said Assignee, its 
successor and assigns, forever subject only to all the provisions contained 
in the said Mortgage.  And the said Assignor hereby constitutes and 
appoints the Assignee as the Assignor’s true and lawful attorney, 
irrevocable in law or in equity, in the Assignor’s name, place and stead but 
at the Assignee’s cost and expense to have, use and take all lawful ways 
and means for the recovery of all the said money and interest; and in case 
of payment, to discharge the same as fully as the Assignor might or could 
do if these presents were not made.  
 
App. 34a (second emphasis added).  
A similar notice was also sent to Vilinsky’s legal counsel.   
 On January 29, 2015, Vilinsky filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey claiming that Phelan violated the FDCPA by communicating with 
him while he was represented by legal counsel in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692c(a).  
Phelan filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court granted.  Vilinsky now appeals. 
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because Vilinsky appeals from a final 
                                              
1 The notice only stated the original amount of the loan, not the unpaid balance.  
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decision of the District Court.  We exercise plenary review.  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 
218, 226 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying plenary review to district court’s decision to grant 
motion to dismiss).   
 Section 805(a)(2) of the FDCPA provides, “a debt collector may not communicate 
with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt . . . if the debt collector 
knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692c(a)(2).  The term “communication” is defined as “the conveying of information 
regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.”  15 U.S.C. § 
1692a(2).   
 The issue in this case is whether a communication needs to be in connection with 
the collection of a debt in order to obtain relief under § 805(a)(2).  We believe that it 
does.  While the term “communication” is defined broadly in § 803(2), its language is 
circumscribed by § 805(a)(2), which prohibits communications with a consumer in 
connection with the collection of any debt.  This conclusion is in accordance with prior 
decisions in this circuit that have examined the scope of the FDCPA.  See, e.g., 
McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, 756 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The 
statute’s substantive provisions . . . make clear that it covers conduct taken in connection 
with the collection of any debt.”  (internal quotations omitted)).   
 The only remaining question is whether Phelan violated § 805(a)(2).  To answer 
that question, we must ascertain the purpose of the letter.  If Phelan’s intent was to 
“induc[e] payment,” the letter is a communication in connection with the collection of a 
debt and is actionable under § 805(a)(2).  Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 
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266 (3d Cir. 2013).  “[A] communication need not contain an explicit demand for 
payment to constitute debt collection activity.”  McLaughlin, 756 F.3d at 245.  “Indeed, 
communications that include discussions of the status of payment, offers of alternatives 
to default, and requests for financial information may be part of a dialogue to facilitate 
satisfaction of the debt and hence can constitute debt collection activity.”  Id. at 245-46. 
 The record demonstrates that Phelan’s letter was neither an explicit demand for 
payment nor part of a dialogue to facilitate satisfaction of a debt.  First, the state court 
had already entered a judgment foreclosing on the New Jersey property in question.  
Second, the content of the letter demonstrates that its sole purpose was simply to notify 
Vilinsky that PennyMac had assigned its mortgage interest to PMT: 
 FOR VALUE RECEIVED, PENNYMAC CORP., the undersigned, 
as beneficiary or successor thereto, whose address is 6101 CONDOR 
DRIVE, SUITE 300, MOORPARK, CA 93021, hereby grants, conveys, 
assigns and transfers unto PMT NPL Financing 2014-1, whose address is 
c/o PennyMac Loan Services, LLC, 6101 CONDOR DRIVE, SUITE 200, 
MOORPARK, CA 93021, its successors and assigns, all beneficial interest 
under that certain Mortgage dated 03/24/2007.   
 
App. 34a.   
 
   Vilinsky points out that the letter notified him that the assignee of the mortgage 
may “use and take all lawful ways and means for the recovery of all the said money and 
interest” and referenced the amount of the loan.  App. 34a.  We do not believe, however, 
that this can be classified as collection activity.  Rather, Phelan was merely identifying 
the affected mortgage and notifying Vilinsky that the assignment gave PMT all legal 
rights that had previously been assigned to PennyMac.   
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the order of the District Court.  
